presented at this conference demonstrate that perhaps the most progress was made in developing behavioral models of the negotiations process, strikes and impasses and the various procedures for conflict resolution. Behavioral models of the organizational characteristics of trade unions, particularly their structure, internal democracy, membership participation, and overall effectiveness have also been developed (Child, Loveridge, and Warner, 1973; Anderson, 1977) . Models of organizational change under collective bargaining have been proposed (Kochan and Dyer, 1976 ) and the process of changing the work environment in unionized organizations has been studied empirically (Goodman, 1979) .
One of the areas of industrial relations that has not yet been systematically addressed by behavioral researchers is the study of management under collective bargaining. In fact, the study of management under collective bargaining has generally been neglected by North American scholars since the classic study by Slichter, Healy, and Livernash (1960) .
The purpose of this paper is to take a first step toward a model of the role of behavior of management under collective bargaining. The paper will apply some of the principles outlined in an earlier review paper, (Kochan, 1980a ) for moving toward a stronger integration of behavioral science theories, concepts, and techniques into the study and practice of collective bargaining and industrial relations. Some descriptive data collected in a survey of over 600 private sector (Freedman, 1979) will be used to illustrate the need and the potential for the kind of theory and research advocated here.
Type of Model Needed
In an earlier paper (Kochan, 1980a ) I argued that the behavioral sciences have a potentially important role to play in improving our understanding and in influencing the practices of industrial relations at the micro (organizational) level.
To realize this potential, models or theories of the middle range are needed that (1) are sensitive to the normative premises underlying the study and practice of industrial relations and (2) focus on the key outcomes of interest to industrial relations scholars and practitioners. Too often, behavioral scientists have been insensitive to the diversity of interests represented at the workplace and have failed to adequately understand the nature of labor-management relations and collective bargaining. Consequently, the models that have been developed within mainstream organizational behavior have often been too abstract or general, or have failed to understand the issues of central concern in industrial relations, thereby limiting their utility for industrial relations researchers, policymakers, or practitioners. Consequently, this paper will start by first laying out some of the normative considerations that are relevant to the study of management under collective bargaining, then present a general model that helps identify where management characteristics and practices fit into a collective bargaining system, and finally suggest some of the key questions that a theory of management under collective bargaining should address. It is hoped that this effort will provide a framework for guiding empirical research on these issues and will help to stimulate renewed interest in this area.
Normative Perspectives
The material in this paper is oriented towards the American Collective bargaining system. This conflict is derived from workers' drive for economic security, independence, and control over workplace decisions and employer concerns for economic efficiency and discretion and control over decision making. The conflict of interests is viewed as inherent, permanent, and legitimate, yet both parties share a common interdependence that requires periodic accomodation of their interests. Therefore, there is an assumption that industrial relations decisions can best be arrived at through negotiations, compromise and accomodation. Collective bargaining is one means of structuring and regulating this decision making process.
For this process to work, both labor and management must accept the legitimacy of the other party to the process, and indeed must be committed to making the process work. The role of power is central to this pluralistic model. Indeed, it will be argued here that the pluralistic model requires a minimum balance of power between labor and management for the negotiations and accomodation process to work effectively. Unless each party has sufficient power to require the other to respond to its interests, the negotiations process will not be initiated or sustained through time and the system will turn to one of unilateral determination or paternalism.
Management's role under collective bargaining, therefore, is to not only protect the efficiency and other managerial interests of the firm, but to also contribute to the effective functioning of the bargaining system and to the improvement of the bargaining relationship. It is important to keep these normative assumptions in mind, since as will be discussed in more detail later, there -4-is growing evidence that the normative assumptions regarding the role of management underlying this pluralistic model are not entirely consistent with management behavior in the U.S. Indeed, a major theme running through this paper is that we must recognize even more than before that the key to making the pluralistic model survive and work as a means of accomodating diverse interests is that each party to the bargaining relationship must have sufficient power to force the other party to accept the pluralistic norms and to generate and sustain commitment to the bargaining system.
Theoretical Perspectives
Before developing the propositions concerning the role and behavior of management, the broader theoretical model of collective bargaining must be out- These traditional dimensions of the bargaining system must then be evaluated against the goals of individual workers, employers, and the public in order to measure the performance of the bargaining system. A comprehensive understanding of the role of management within this framework requires that we first explain how variations in the characteristics and behavior of management are influenced by other system characteristics and then relate these variables to the dependent variables outlined above and to the goals of the parties and the public. Although empirical evidence in this area is quite difficult to generate, the same dual approaches to union avoidance appear to be present in the U.S.
today. Indeed, there seems to be a relatively systematic relationship between the characteristics of the economic and organizational environments of employers and the strategies used to avoid unions. Those environmental and organizational conditions that appear to increase the probability that a firm will use a direct suppression strategy are: (1) the presence of a hostile political and social environment towards unions, (2) domination of the work force by low wage unskilled workers with few labor market alternatives, (3) an abundant supply of labor, (4) low recruitment and training costs, (5) low-profit--highly competitive industries, (6) small plants, and (7) the absence of a professional personnel staff.
In contrast, those firms that use a strategy of trying to reduce the psychological and economic incentives for employees to organize are more likely to be found in an environment of rapid growth, high profits, large scale production and employ workers who have sufficient skills and/or training to warrant the investment of a professional personnel and human resource management staff and program. Furthermore, firms employing this latter strategy often use sophisticated behavioral science techniques to monitor employee attitudes and economic welfare. In general, these firms tend to pay wages and fringe benefits that are equal to or comparable to workers in the same labor market, provide job security guarantees, and encourage the use of the most innovative techniques for promoting communications, information sharing, and development of trust and participation in decision making (Foulkes, 1980) .
The evidence for these explanations of differences in strategies used to keep out unions come largely from case studies (Foulkes, 1980; Berenbiem, 1980) .
While there are no quantitative indicators, many people believe that management is becoming increasingly aggressive and effective in its efforts to avoid unions in the U.S. and that this increased management aggressiveness has had a deleterious effect on the overall climate for collective bargaining.
Intensity of Management Resistance
Only very superficial evidence of the current level of intensity of management opposition to unionization is available. The Conference Board survey (Freedman, 1979; Kochan, 1980) showed that among firms that currently have some employees organized "new union organizing" was ranked fourth in the list of eight labor relations goals. Approximately ten percent of these firms reported that avoiding union organizing was their top labor relations objective, however, thirty percent indicated that this objective was among the top three in importance to their firm. Twenty percent indicated this goal was not considered at all relevant to their firms. Those firms that gave this goal a higher ranking were ones in which only a minority of their current employees are organized. A -.43 correlation was obtained between a measure of the importance attached to avoiding further unionization and the percentage of current employees unionized. When a sample of unorganized firms was examined, however, almost all firms ranked avoidance of unionization as the most important labor To date, what little work that has been done on the question of management policies towards unions has been largely atheoretical. We do have the classic historical study of Bendix (1964) that stresses the ideological bases of managerial opposition to unions in the U.S. His thesis may provide the overriding explanation for generalized resistance to unions that we find among American managers.
The fact that managerial intensity of interests in avoiding unionization declines as the percentage of a firms' employees unionized increases, suggest that managers make a pragmatic adaptation to unions, as union power increases.
We also have some evidence that management in the public sector has been less vigorous in its opposition to unions than in the private sector. The traditional explanation for this is that it is politically costly for public sector management to vigorously oppose unions. All of this suggests a rather simple overriding proposition: the intensity of managerial opposition to unions in the U.S. is inversely related to the power a union can bring to bear on the employer.
In any event, it is probably less important to understand why management opposes unionization in the U.S. than it is to recognize that the opposition is generally strong and then to relate variations in overall management policies toward unions to their consequences for the collective bargaining system. to which management engages in these structural adaptations is partially a function of union power or pressure (Goldner, 1970; Kochan, 1975) . At the same time, it is clear that a good deal of managerial discretion exists over these decisions since these environmental pressures can only explain a small percentage of the variance in either the power of boundary spanning units (Kochan, 1975) or even the size of the labor relations staff (Kochan, 1980b) . Indeed, an effort to relate the Conference Board data on managerial structure to characteristics of the external environment that influence the power of the union was only marginally successful in explaining the size of the labor relations unit and generally unsuccessful in explaining the degree of specialization of centralization of decision-making power.
One reason for the lack of ability to explain variance using these propotions is that management generally views labor relations as a very strategic function requiring a highly centralized decision making process. The key strategic decisions over bargaining goals are made at the top levels of major corporations (Freedman, 1979; Kochan, 1980b) while the operational aspects of labor relations policy are often carried out as lower levels. It may also be that environment-organizational response theorists understate the importance of internal political conflicts that are generated whenever structural change is being considered. Thus future research on the structural responses of employers to trade unions should examine more closely the strategic considerations that influence how an organization structures itself and coordinates its internal decision-making process in bargaining with an adversary.
The Effects of Management Adjustments
The pressure for formalization of managerial policies arises from both the need for the firm to absorb the uncertainty that a union brings into the personnel and human resource planning function and the need to absorb the and/or increase prices. Thus, the way management adjusts its policies to the presence of a union has important implications for the ultimate effects of collective bargaining on the economic goals of the firm, its employees and the public. Management's response to unions will also influence the behavioral aspects of the bargaining relationship since it will affect the climate and level of trust that develops between the union and management leaders and the attitudes of the workers toward their jobs, the employer and the union. Consequently, the nature and effects of these managerial adjustments to unions is an extremely important building block in a theory of management under collective bargaining. Figure 2 presents a three stage model for tracing the effects of unions and these managerial adjustments on the economic and behavioral outcomes of interest to the firm, to employees, and to the public. The first stage of the model suggests that the major and primary effects of unions will be to improve wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions. Management will then attempt to respond by tightening up on work rules, introducing new technology, changing the organization of the work or the allocation of workers, a raising the quality of the workforce by either training existing workers or recruiting higher quality employees. The extent to which management is successful in recouping the increased costs of unionization through these managerial adjustments will determine the effects of collective bargaining on productivity and costs, and therefore, on employment, profits and prices. Thus, the ultimate effect of collective bargaining on these outcomes is determined by the joint effects of the power of the union to achieve gains for its members that increase costs and the ability of the employer to find ways of absorbing these costs through various managerial adjustments.
None of the managerial adjustments discussed above are neutral in terms of their effects on goals and interests of the employees and the union. Conse- shown that industrial relations seems to make a difference, and leave it to the behavioralists the task of identifying the dimensions of the collective bargaining relationship that influence productivity and, particularly, the managerial policies and practices that play a role within this process.
A number of recent studies have looked at the effect of unions and collective bargaining on job satisfaction and other measures of employee well-being under collective bargaining. The dominant finding to date is that unions increase satisfaction with the bread and butter issues of wages, job security, and fringe benefits, but are negatively related to satisfaction with job content, supervision, II -13-resource adequacy, and challenge. (Hammer, 1979; Freeman, 1976; Kochan and Helfman, 1979) . Again these are simply cross sectional surveys of individual workers which leave unexplained variations around the average union effect.
The challenge for behavioral scientists is to look at the variations within the collective bargaining relationship that influence these results.
Management Behavior in Negotiations
The The lower the level of trust and the more hostile the climate between the employer and the union the more formal legalistic procedures take precedence over informal resolution processes. The Brett and Goldberg (1979) study of wildcat strikes in the coal industry support the argument that management labor relations policies, and the degree of trust workers have in management, influcence the use of the grievance procedures and the probability of wildcat strikes. If
is correct in arguing that the pluralistic model of industrial relations leads to declining levels of trust within organizations and that this declining trust level in turn leads to declining levels of performance within an industrial relations system, then the study of the effects of trust and the factors that influence its development is indeed an important one.
A number of studies have attempted to develop theories of grievance rates or reliance on arbitration. Many of these apply the same general systems type model that was outlined in Figure 1 (Peach and Livernash, 1975; Knight, 1979) .
A number of studies have examined the effects of differences in leadership styles of first line supervisors. Beyond these isolated examples, however, there is little theory or empirical evidence on the effects of different management characteristics on the administrative dimension of bargaining relationships.
Change in Collective Bargaining
Change does not come naturally to a collective bargaining system since there are no strong economic incentives on the parties to make major changes in their bargaining relationship as long as things are working as well as can be expected.
Both management and Union decision makers can be expected to engage in satisficing rather than optimizing behavior (Simon, 1955) . When change does occur, it is often more incremental than dramatic and more sporadic than continuous in nature.
The weak incentive for introducing change as long as a satisfactory level of performance is being achieved is reinforced by the high political risks associated with change strategies to both union and employer representatives.
Given the difficulty of introducing change, it is not surprising that organizational behavioral theorists have had difficulty in applying models of change from psychology or organizational theory to the context of union-management relations.
One of the problems with efforts to apply models of this nature to collective bargaining is that the researchers often have assumed that the change process is inherently cooperative or integrative. In fact, two types of change _1_ --· 1_1-11111___1_ All change models start with the assumption that for change to be initiated some form of pressure or stimulus must be felt by the parties (Lewin, 1947) . Under these conditions, the parties are likely to turn to the formal negotiations process to achieve the desired changes. When management initiates this type of change strategy, the critical variables that appear to affect its success are
(1) its ability and willingness to sustain a strike over the issue, (2) the degree of centralization and coordination of the management effort so that internal defections from the management position do not occur, and (3) the willingness of management to protect the job security of the workers and the organizational security of the union. This type of change process is most often found when the issue is the introduction of new technology or the negotiation of major productivity improvements (Levinson et al, 1970 ).
The alternative form of change, and the one that behavioral science is more accustomed to, is a joint integrative type of problem-solving process that supplements the formal negotiations of a new contract. This type of process is most likely to occur when the target of the change effort is the climate of the relationship, the level of trust between the parties, or the attitudes or behavior of individual workers. This type of change process is also more likely to be used when the benefits associated with the outcomes of change are less certain so that more problem-solving efforts are needed to search for the optimal solution to the problem, (2) neither party is seeking a major change in their existing -18-influences the success of the process. In addition, management must be willing to make the organizational structural adaptations needed to give sufficient authority to the joint labor management committee or problem-solving group that manages the change process. Finally, the benefits from the change process must be shared in an equitable fashion between the management and the workers. This type of strategy has been commonly advocated by those seeking to get unions and employers to more aggressively address issues associated with the quality of work, work place safety and health, and productivity.
This is a difficult form of organizational change to sustain within a collective bargaining relationship because it requires continuous interaction and the ability to sustain the periodic efforts to use the power-strike based form of change in negotiations. Thus, this type of process is most likely to work during the term of an agreement and is most seriously challenged as the time for negotiating a new contract approaches. Since this type of process is more amenable to addressing problems associated with individual workers, this is the type of process where behavioral scientists have the greatest potential for improving through a combination of research and action. A substantial number of American managers are interested in addressing problems of productivity and worker attitudes through some form of change process (Freedman, 1979) yet they have been hesitant to do so because of the risks associated with these efforts.
Conclusions and Implications
This paper has reviewed a very broad range of issues relevant to the study of management under collective bargaining. An effort was made to both summarize existing knowledge as well as to offer a series of questions and several propositions for further research. It is clear that the study of management under collective bargaining will take on added importance in the coming years.
American employers face a critical strategic choice as they enter the 1980s.
During the 1970s many American employers displayed a declining commitment to The kind of middle range theories and empirical research efforts being advocated here can make a contribution to both our understanding of the consequences of these two alternatives and to the probability that employers will succeed in whichever strategy they choose. Unfortunately, the dominat contribution of behavioral science research in the 1960s and 1970s was to increase the probability that those employers would succeed who chose the strategy of strongly resisting trade unions. It is hoped by developing a better understanding of the nature of collective bargaining, and particularly of the role and effects of management behavior under collective bargaining, that the 1980s will be a decade in which behavioral scientists help make it easier for employers to choose the alternative strategy. 
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